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Executive functioning is supposed to have an important role in decision making under
risk. Several studies reported that more advantageous decision-making behavior was
accompanied by better performance in tests of executive functioning and that the
decision-making process was accompanied by activations in prefrontal and subcortical
brain regions associated with executive functioning. However, to what extent different
components of executive functions contribute to decision making is still unclear. We
tested direct and indirect effects of three executive functions on decision-making
performance in a laboratory gambling task, the Game of Dice Task (GDT). Using Brand’s
model of decisions under risk (2006) we tested seven structural equation models with
three latent variables that represent executive functions supposed to be involved in
decision making. The latent variables were general control (represented by the general
ability to exert attentional and behavioral self-control that is in accordance with task goals
despite interfering information), concept formation (represented by categorization, rule
detection, and set maintenance), and monitoring (represented by supervision of cognition
and behavior). The seven models indicated that only the latent dimension general control
had a direct effect on decision making under risk. Concept formation and monitoring
only contributed in terms of indirect effects, when mediated by general control. Thus,
several components of executive functioning seem to be involved in decision making
under risk. However, general control functions seem to have a key role. They may be
important for implementing the calculative and cognitively controlled processes involved
in advantageous decision making under risk.
Keywords: decisions under risk, executive functions, structural equation model, Game of Dice Task, self-control,
monitoring
INTRODUCTION
Many decisions in life are made under risk conditions. Under
risk conditions, the available options potentially lead to subop-
timal or negative consequence. It is often differentiated between
two types of risk. Under ambiguous risk, the rules for positive
and negative outcomes from different options are not explicitly
provided to the decision maker. Here we concentrate on objec-
tive risk, which means that explicit information about the rules
for the potential positive and negative consequences are avail-
able to the decision maker (see e.g., Yates and Stone, 1992; Bach
and Dolan, 2012; Volz and Gigerenzer, 2012). Furthermore, prob-
abilities for the occurrence of outcomes are explicit or can be
calculated. An example is the decision of whether or not to take
out an occupational disability insurance while knowing the prob-
ability to become unemployable as a consequence of an accident.
Another example is the decision between either betting that one
specific number will be thrown with a die (e.g., the “6”) or bet-
ting that one of two numbers will be thrown (e.g., the “6” or the
“5”). When a person is confronted with a decision of this kind
and the decision situation is new to him/her (i.e., non-routine),
it should be advantageous for him/her to exert cognitive control
before making the decision. Cognitive control should be use-
ful for example for calculating probabilities before making the
decision or—if several decisions have to be made—for develop-
ing a strategy and control behavior accordingly when making
the choices. For exerting such cognitive control over behavior,
executive functions are thought to be responsible (Norman and
Shallice, 1986; Shallice and Burgess, 1993; Brand et al., 2006).
Executive functioning subsumes a number of component pro-
cesses associated with different prefrontal and subcortical brain
regions, in particular those involved in fronto-striatal loops (see
e.g., Andres, 2003; Jurado and Rosselli, 2007). While several
neuropsychological studies supported the assumption that exec-
utive functions are involved in decision making under risk (e.g.,
Brand et al., 2005; Delazer et al., 2007; Euteneuer et al., 2009),
the current study aims at investigating the impact of different
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subcomponents of executive functioning on decision-making
performance.
One certain model (Brand et al., 2006) suggests that execu-
tive functions are involved in assessing probabilities, planning,
and applying decision-making strategies, and using feedback to
monitor strategies and to revise them if necessary. The main
assumptions of the model are depicted in Figure 1.
The model suggests that executive functions process available
information about the decision situation. Executive functions are
furthermore involved in categorizing options, for example with
respect to their potential gains and losses, as well as with respect
to probabilities. Then executive functions guide the selection of
information, the development of decision-making strategies, as
well as the systematic application of the strategies. The model
assumes that feedback about decisions’ consequences can be pro-
cessed on two routes: a cognitive and an emotional route. On
the cognitive route (indicated by the blue arrows) executive func-
tions are important for making use of the feedback. This involves
consciously monitoring the decision strategy’s consequence and
revising the current strategy if necessary. On the emotional route
(indicated by the red arrows) feedback can result in the develop-
ment of automatic bodily signals (somatic markers, as suggested
by Damasio, 1994, 1996; Bechara et al., 1997), which are experi-
enced as hunches and guesses.
The relationship between executive functions and making
decisions under objective risk conditions has frequently been
investigated with the Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al.,
2005). The GDT is a measure of decision making under risk with
explicit and stable rules for gains, losses, and their probabilities.
In this computerized game of dice, participants have the goal to
increase their fictitious starting capital of C1000 in 18 throws of
a single die. Before each throw they have to guess which number
will be thrown. The participants always have to decide whether
they bet on one single number (possible gain/loss: C1000) or
on combinations of two (C500), three (C200), or four (C100)
numbers. If the number or one of the numbers of the chosen com-
bination is actually thrown, the participants win fictitious money,
if one of the other numbers is thrown, they lose money. As can
be calculated, betting on one single number and betting on two
numbers is highly risky, leading to high losses in the long run
because winning probabilities are below 34%. Betting on three
numbers or four numbers can be called lowly risky, because win-
ning probabilities are at least 50%, in the long run leading to low
gains/losses or at least retaining the starting capital. Good perfor-
mance in the GDT has been shown to be affected by the ability to
categorize and calculate probability information (e.g., probabili-
ties and expected values; see Schiebener et al., 2011), the ability to
develop and apply long term strategies based on these calculations
(see Brand et al., 2008), and the ability to process the feedback
about the decisions’ consequences (particularly for monitoring
the current strategy’s success, and for revising it if necessary; see
Brand et al., 2006, 2009a,b).
The GDT has been called one of the most important decision-
making tasks (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010). Decision-making per-
formance in the GDT is reduced in patients with neurological
diseases or psychiatric disorders (Svaldi et al., 2010; Bayard et al.,
2011, 2010; Fond et al., 2013), in patients with executive dys-
functions, and in patients with prefrontal cortex damage (Brand
et al., 2004, 2009b, 2005; Delazer et al., 2007; Euteneuer et al.,
2009; Rossi et al., 2010). The role of deficits in executive func-
tioning for decisions under objective risk was also supported in
studies using other decision tasks than the GDT (Rogers et al.,
1999; Manes et al., 2002; Sinz et al., 2008). Furthermore, relation-
ships between executive domain tests and decision tasks were also
found in brain-healthy participants (Brand et al., 2009a; Brand
and Markowitsch, 2010; Del Missier et al., 2010, 2012; Gansler
et al., 2011; Schiebener et al., 2011, 2012).
Underlining the important role of executive functions when
making decisions under objective risk, the inferior and dorsolat-
eral parts of the prefrontal cortex have been found to be activated
during these decisions, as well as the anterior cingulate cortex
and the posterior parietal cortex (Rogers et al., 1999; Labudda
et al., 2008). Activations of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
point toward roles of monitoring, categorization, and shifting
(Burgess et al., 2000; Shafritz et al., 2005; Lie et al., 2006). The
activation of the anterior cingulate cortex has been interpreted as
FIGURE 1 | The model of decision making under risk. A major role
of executive functions is suggested for the development and
application of decision-making strategies as well as for processing of
feedback. Blue arrows indicate the cognitive feedback route, red
arrows the emotional feedback route. Adapted according to Brand
et al. (2006).
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a sign for conflict resolution processes during decision making
(Labudda et al., 2008).
In summary, behavioral, and brain imaging studies point
toward the important role of executive functions for decision
making under objective risk, as measured for example by the
GDT. However, little is known about which executive functions
are crucial in determining this decision-making performance or
how they may determine decision making in interaction. Thus,
in the current study, we used a structural equation model (SEM)
approach to investigate the role of different executive functions in
predicting decision making in the GDT.
In the following, we explain the theoretical derivation for the
SEM. For this, the main question is which components of execu-
tive functioning may particularly be involved in decision making
under risk conditions. So far, researchers neither have agreed
on a common definition of executive functions, nor have they
agreed on a model or a theory defining how executive functions
operate or which subcomponents of executive functioning exist.
Nevertheless, the different existing definitions may be summa-
rized as follows: Executive functions are a higher level cognitive
system controlling and piloting behavior and cognition. They
allow humans to regulate behavior and cognition in a planned,
goal oriented, flexible, and effective way (Shallice and Burgess,
1996; Lezak et al., 2004; Jurado and Rosselli, 2007; Anderson et al.,
2008).
For the current study’s design we referred to a relatively fre-
quently cited model of executive functioning that was suggested
by Norman and Shallice (Norman and Shallice, 1986; Shallice,
1988). The model postulates that two modes are responsible for
directing behavior and cognition: the contention scheduling (CS)
mode and the supervisory attentional system (SAS). The CSmode
is responsible for selecting routine schemas to perform cognitive
and behavioral routine tasks (e.g., buying a coffee in the coffee
bar every morning). A schema is a predefined set of operation
units (e.g., standard motor operations, such as walking to the cof-
fee bar, pulling out the wallet etc.), required for realizing the goal.
The phenomenological materialization of a schema is a strategy
(Stuss et al., 1995; Shallice, 2002). When a situation is new and no
routine schemas are available or the routine schemas are inappro-
priate, the SAS needs to take control. It inhibits routine schemas
and directs cognitive resources to find solutions for the given
problem by developing appropriate new schemas. Suchlike exec-
utive control exerted by the SAS is suggested to be comprised of
several component processes, that is different executive functions
(Shallice and Burgess, 1996). Stuss et al. (1995) named five func-
tions but pointed out that this list is not complete: “energization
of schemata, inhibition of schemata, adjustment of contention
scheduling, monitoring of schema activity, and control of ‘if-then’
logical processes” (p. 193). Examples for further components of
executive functioning that have been mentioned in the literature
are inhibition, shifting, updating, task management, monitor-
ing, planning, coding, problem solving, or generating strategies
(Borkowsky and Burke, 1996; Smith, 1999; Miyake et al., 2000;
Elliott, 2003; Salthouse et al., 2003; Friedman et al., 2006, 2008;
Jurado and Rosselli, 2007; Miyake and Friedman, 2012). To the
best of our knowledge the CS-SAS model by Norman and Shallice
(1986) is well accepted and is the only model which in detail
describes the potential functioning of different components of
executive functioning as well as the potential interactions between
them. Therefore, we refer to this model for the theoretical deriva-
tion of the SEM. We use the general assumptions of the CS-SAS
model (Norman and Shallice, 1986) and the model of decision
making under risk (Brand et al., 2006) for inferring on a set
of executive components which might potentially affect deci-
sion making under risk. Please note that—although based on
theory—the choice of functions we investigate inevitably remains
arbitrary to some extent. In other words, one might also find rea-
sons to concentrate on investigating the differential roles of other
components of executive functioning.
The model of decision making under objective risk (Brand
et al., 2006) assumes that executive functions are important for
processing information about the decision situation (categorizing
alternatives according to gains, losses, and probabilities, under-
standing rules for gains and losses, etc.) and for developing
and applying decision-making strategies. Based on these main
assumptions we decided to investigate three executive functions,
which may be involved in these processes:
(1) General control. General control stands for the ability to allo-
cate attention according to a task’s rules and goals. Thus,
general control also involves the ability to inhibit the initi-
ation of automatically imposing responses which are not in
accordance with the task’s rules and goals. One may also call
this function attentional and behavioral self-control. In terms
of the CS-SAS model general control is the ability to control
whether a schema is activated and to shift to another schema
if the imposing schema is inappropriate. In a novel deci-
sion situation under risk, for example when being confronted
with the GDT for the first time, general control may be
responsible for inhibiting the activation of a schema such as
making generally unplanned choices or following an impulse
of choosing the option were the highest monetary gain is
offered. Furthermore, the model suggests that general con-
trol enables a shift to developing or acting out a new/revised
strategy, if the current strategy appears inappropriate.
(2) Concept formation. Concept formation subsumes the ability
to form concepts of a non-routine task situation and man-
age solving of the task according to this concept. This ability
may involve several processes, particularly categorization of
information, detection of task rules, and maintenance of task
solving strategies (often called set maintenance). In a decision
situation under risk that is novel to the decider, this func-
tion may be involved in categorizing options with regard to
potential gains and losses as well as with regard to proba-
bilities (Brand et al., 2006). Furthermore, this function may
be involved in using feedback in order to check and revise
decision-making strategies (Brand et al., 2009a; Schiebener
et al., 2011), and—when a strategy has been set up—this
function may be involved in maintenance of behavior that
is in accordance with the strategy (Brand et al., 2008, 2006).
(3) Monitoring. We use the term monitoring for the ability
to supervise whether one’s own behavior is in accordance
with and leads to a goal. The main ingredient of success-
ful monitoring should be keeping information up-to-date
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in short-term memory. For example, when performing on
one schema in a series of scheduled schemas, the schedule
should need to be kept up-to-date. In terms of the CS-SAS
model monitoring may be described as an online process
of keeping in mind a superior goal while currently another
schema is active. For example, in decision making under risk,
a schema (i.e., a current decision-making strategy) may be
active. The schema may for example be: Making a series of
five decisions for the four number alternative in the GDT.
In this example, monitoring may be important for keep-
ing track of the current position in the action units of this
schema (such as knowing that this is the third of five deci-
sions for four-number combinations). At the same time it
should be advantageous to keep in mind the task goal (reach-
ing the best possible outcome) and to check the fit between
the current strategy and the goal (e.g., by keeping in mind the
consequences of previous success with the current strategy).
The current study has two aims. First, to examine the extent
of impact each of these three components of executive func-
tioning has on decision making under risk. Second, to examine
whether the three components affect decision making under risk
in interaction. Shallice and Stuss (2008) pointed out that some
components of the SAS interact and that the SAS-component
“attentiveness” (denoting the general allocation of processing
resources) is responsible for implementing the cognitive or behav-
ioral output. We regard attentiveness as being represented best by
general control, because general control stands for the ability to
allocate attention and to implement the behavioral output to be
in accordance with a task’s rules and goals. Thus, our behavioral
output (decision making) may particularly be affected by general
control. Monitoring (e.g., keeping task goals in mind) and con-
cept formation (e.g., understanding and applying the task rules,
categorizing stimuli, etc.) may be preconditions for being able
to exert this general control in a way that it serves a task goal.
Therefore, the effects of concept formation and monitoring on
decision making may be mediated by general control abilities.
For considering this hypothesis as being supported, we require
the model fit of this mediation model to be significantly better
than the fit of six other models assuming all possible predictor-
mediator combinations predicting decision making under risk
(see Table 3).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 152 brain-healthy participants (66 males, 86
females), aged 18–75 years (M = 38.67 years, SD = 16.42 years)
by local advertisement. Only 25 participants (16%) were students.
They received C20 or course credits. Testing took place at the
department of General Psychology: Cognition, at the University
of Duisburg-Essen. Screening interview and self-report ques-
tionnaires were used to exclude participants with a history of
neurological or psychiatric diseases. For participants over 50 the
DemTect (Kalbe et al., 2004) was used to control for dementia
(all scores were 13 or higher, indicating no signs of demen-
tia). The study was approved by the local ethics committee of
the Department of Computer Science and Applied Cognitive
Science of the University of Duisburg-Essen. The committee
decides on the ethical soundness of studies by referring to the
declaration of Helsinki and the recommendation on ethics in
psychological research published by the German Psychological
Association. All participants gave their informed consent prior to
the investigation.
INSTRUMENTS/PROCEDURE
All participants completed the GDT (Brand et al., 2005) and
then a series of neuropsychological tests, involving executive func-
tioning tests and the LPS subtest reasoning to estimate general
intelligence (Horn, 1983). The tests of executive functions were
chosen because they are face valid for covering one of the three
functions each, as will be explained below for each task. Please
note two things: First, there is no empirical data showing that the
tasks cover these domains so far. Second, the tasks do not neces-
sarily assess these functions exclusively, as described below. This is
a typical problem of executive functioning tasks and is known as
the task impurity problem (Burgess, 1997; Phillips, 1997). Thus,
we can only argue—based on the task’s structures—that the main
variance in these tasks is produced by individual differences in the
three functions (i.e., either general control, concept formation, or
monitoring).
DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK—GAME OF DICE TASK
In the computerized Game of Dice Task (Brand et al., 2005) the
goal is to increase the fictitious starting capital of C1000 during
18 throws of one virtual die. Before each throw, participants guess
which number (1–6) will be thrown. The die is thrown and the
participants win if the guess was correct and lose if it was wrong.
The bet can be placed on one single number or a combination of
two, three, or four numbers. If the chosen number or one of the
numbers among the chosen combination is thrown, participants
win, if one of the other numbers is thrown, they lose. For example,
the bet may be placed on two numbers, such as the “1” and the
“2.” The die is thrown and C500 is won in case the number “1” or
“2” is thrown. In case one of the other numbers is thrown (the “3,”
“4,” “5,” or “6”), C500 is lost. Analogously, the participants can
also bet on one, three, or on four numbers. The gains, losses (sta-
ble and permanently shown on screen), and probabilities (stable,
not shown on screen) are:
- One single number: C1000 gain/loss (winning probability 1:6).
- Two numbers: C500 gain/loss (winning probability 2:6).
- Three numbers: C200 gain/loss (winning probability 3:6).
- Four numbers: C100 gain/loss (winning probability 4:6).
Participants are informed about all rules, the number of trials,
and that they can continue playing even if their balance is nega-
tive. Gains and losses are accompanied by distinct sounds, and are
presented on screen after each throw. The current balance and the
number of played and remaining rounds are permanently kept
up-to-date and shown on screen (Brand et al., 2005).
According to the convention, the options can be grouped into
“high risk,” “disadvantageous” (one or two numbers with a win-
ning probability less than 34%) and “low risk,” “advantageous”
(three or four numbers with a winning probability of 50% and
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higher). Choosing the low risk options most probably leads to a
positive overall capital in the long run, because winning proba-
bilities are 50% or higher, promising at least to retain the starting
capital of C1000. Choosing high risk alternatives normally results
in a negative overall capital, because the winning probabilities are
below 34%.
Main measures
As measure of GDT performance, a net score is used (the number
of decisions for low risk options minus the number of deci-
sions for high risk options). The net score is positive when more
advantageous than disadvantageous decisions are made.
GENERAL CONTROL
Color word interference test (CWIT)—interference trial
The interference trial of the CWIT (Stroop, 1935; Bäumler, 1985)
is a paper task measuring attentional control, also called inter-
ference control. Participants are presented with a piece of paper
showing a list of 72 color words. Themeaning of each word differs
from its ink color (color words and ink colors: red, blue, green,
and yellow). Participants are asked to speak out the ink colors
of the words one after the other as quickly and as accurately as
possible.
In this task, good performance requires strong control over
attention involving inhibition of the impulse to read out the
word. Besides inhibiting the impulse it is necessary to shift to
categorizing and naming the ink color of each word.
Main measure
We measured CWIT performance by the time the participants
needed to complete naming the colors on the list (shorter times
indicate better performance). We used the raw time instead of
a residual or difference score which would subtract processing
speed (as measured by reading- and color-trials of the CWIT).
Given that we aimed to measure control over attentional pro-
cessing resources, which also involves speed, we also allowed our
measurement to involve processing speed.
Trail making test part B (TMT B)
The TMT B (Reitan, 1958; Reitan and Wolfson, 1995) assesses
psychomotor control and loads particularly on inhibitory control
and shifting. Participants are presented with a paper-sheet with
encircled numbers (1–13) and letters (A–L). The task is to connect
numbers and letters alternating in numerical, respectively alpha-
betical order, starting with 1, proceeding to A, followed by 2, B,
etc., and ending with 13.
Comparable to the CWIT this task loads on attention control
and requires inhibiting the automatic impulse of drawing the line
to the next number or letter in the order. Instead, it is necessary to
shift to another response category before drawing each new line.
Main measure
The TMT B performance is measured by the time needed to com-
plete all connections (shorter times indicate better performance).
Again, for the same reasons as with the CWIT, we used the raw
time instead of a residual or difference score.
CONCEPT FORMATION
Modified card sorting test (MCST)
The MCST (Nelson, 1976) is a modification of the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948). In the computerized task,
the participants need to categorize options, detect rules andmain-
tain sets. Participants are presented with a deck of cards. Each card
shows a certain number (1–4) of shapes (square, circle, triangle,
or star) in a color (blue, red, green, or yellow). The participants
have to sort every appearing card to one of four target cards.
However, they do not know what sorting rule to apply (sort-
ing rules: by number of shapes, by shape, by color of shapes).
Feedback (visual and acoustic) is given and can be used to find the
correct sorting rule. After six cards are consecutively sorted cor-
rectly, participants are informed that the rule has changed. They
then have to find out the new rule by trial and error.
The MCST has previously also been found to load on set shift-
ing/cognitive flexibility and inhibition (see e.g., Miyake et al.,
2000). Nevertheless, given the concept of the MCST, we assume
that the three main abilities are categorization, rule detection, and
set maintenance because participants have to use feedback to rec-
ognize a sorting rule for cards and have to apply the sorting rule
according to different categories of card symbols. Without being
able to categorize information, detect rules and maintain sets,
it should be impossible to solve the task successfully. Inhibition
and shifting may be involved but are probably not the main
components.
Main measure
We used two measures: The number of perseverative errors (card
is sorted according to the sorting rule of the previous completed
category) and the number of non-perseverative errors (number
of incorrectly sorted cards minus number of non-perseverative
errors).
MONITORING
Balanced Switching Task (BST)
The BST was developed to assess monitoring. The BST is a volun-
tary task switching paradigm similar to a task used by Arrington
and Logan (2004). Furthermore, it shares some conceptual fea-
tures with the Hotel Task (Manly et al., 2002), which is said to
measure monitoring. In the Hotel Task different tasks have to be
completed and participants have to switch between them in order
to complete as much of each task as possible and to complete each
of the tasks to comparable amounts. The Hotel task was also con-
sidered as a measure of monitoring for the current study, but was
not chosen because of its complexity with regard to the differ-
ent demands the subtask place on executive functions. We tried
to keep the demands and difficulty of the subtasks in the BST as
comparable as possible.
In the BST participants have four tasks. They can switch
between them voluntarily. The explicit aim is to work on each of
the four tasks to equal amounts. There are two sets of stimuli (set
A: two-digit numbers from 01 to 99 and set B: abstract geometric
shapes with diagonal hedging). Within the sets, the participants
can work on one of two tasks at the same time. In set A, task 1
is to indicate whether the presented number is odd (press “d” on
the keyboard) or even (press “f”). Task 2 is to indicate whether
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the number is below 50 (“j”) or above 50 (“k”). In set B, task
1 is to indicate whether the diagonal hedging within the shape
is directed to the upper left (“d”) or to the upper right corner
(“f”). Task 2 is to indicate whether the shape is oriented verti-
cally (higher than broad, “j”) or horizontally (broader than high,
“k”). With the space bar the participants can switch between the
sets A and B. Within the sets, they can switch between the tasks 1
and 2, by switching between the response keys (“d,” “f”/“j,” “k”).
Only one stimulus is presented at the same time. With each pre-
sented stimulus the participants have to apply only one of the four
tasks.
The participants are informed that they have three aims:
- working on all tasks as equally often as possible.
- classifying the stimuli as correctly as possible.
- working on as many stimuli as possible (by making quick
responses).
They are also informed that switching between the sets with the
space bar results in a loss of time. This rule was used to increase
the load on monitoring. One can assume that the rule motivates
staying with one task for a longer time. Staying longer in one set
should increase the cognitive effort of keeping in mind how long
and how often they have worked on the other tasks before and the
effort of remembering that further switches need to be made.
The duration of the task (two blocks of 4min) and the stim-
ulus presentation times (until response is made, but maximally
1000ms) are not known by the participants. The inter-stimulus
interval is 500ms, a switch between sets A and B costs 1250ms of
the overall time. All subtasks as well as the overall task are prac-
ticed. For each participant the experimenters made sure during
the practice trials that the task was fully understood.
After each of the 4-min blocks, feedback on participants’ per-
formance is provided with respect to the three aims. After the first
block the participants are reminded of the four existing tasks and
the assignment of the response keys.
We assume that performing well in the BST requires particu-
larly monitoring abilities. Although other executive process such
as shifting and inhibition may be involved, the main compo-
nent that should be required to be able to distribute work on
the four tasks to equal shares should be monitoring, because it
has to be monitored continuously that there are other tasks to
work on. Furthermore, participants have to monitor how often
and how extensively they worked on the current and on the other
tasks.
Main measure
We used a so called deviation score. This was computed for each of
the two blocks (BST 1, BST 2). The deviation score formula was
derived from the statistical formula for computing the standard
deviation of a sample. The deviation score indicates the deviation
from the optimally equal/balanced performance (0% deviation:
optimal performance; 43% deviation: worst performance, i.e.,
working on only one of the tasks). For the score, the percentages
of stimuli presentations within each of the four tasks were used
as basis (e.g., number of stimuli presented in task 1 divided by
the number of stimuli presented overall). In the formula below,
this value is denoted by the variables taskA1, taskA2, taskB1, and
taskB2. From this value the optimal value of equal performance
(25% in each task) was subtracted and the result was squared.
This was done for each task. The results were summed and then
divided by four. From this result the square root was taken.
deviation score = √{[(taskA1 − 25)2 + (taskA2 − 25)2
+(taskB1 − 25)2 + (taskB2 − 25)2]/4}
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Statistical standard procedures were carried out with IBM SPSS
Statistics (version 21.0, 2012, SPSS inc. IBM, Chicago). Pearson
correlations were calculated to test for zero-order relationships
between two variables. The data were controlled for outliers with
four methods and with respect to all possible pairs of manifest
variables: regression with a random variable, analysis of studen-
tized t, SPSS case-wise methods, and visual control. Detailed
information can be found in the Appendix. Given that no influ-
ential outliers were identified, the analyses were performed with
all subjects.
The TMT B, MCST number of perseverative errors, and devi-
ation from balance in BST block 1 and 2 were normalized with
natural logarithmic transformation because of skewness above
|1.00| or kurtosis above |3.00|.
The SEM analysis was computed with MPlus 6 (Muthén and
Muthén, 2011). The maximum likelihood parameter estimation
was applied. There were no missing data.
Model fits were evaluated by standard criteria (Hu and Bentler,
1995, 1999) for fit indices: χ² test (significant values indicate
that the data significantly deviate from the model), standard-
ized root mean square residual (SRMR; values < 0.08 indicate
a good fit between model and data), comparative fit indices
(CFI/TLI; values > 0.90 indicate a good fit, values > 0.95 an
excellent fit), and root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA; “test of close fit”; a value < 0.08 indicates accept-
able fit). Furthermore, the model was compared to a baseline
model. Significant χ² values for the baseline model indicate that
a theoretical model fits significantly better with the data than
with the baseline model. For comparing models the χ² model
comparison test was used. Furthermore, for model comparison,
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are reported for each
model. Smaller BIC values indicate that a model explains the data
better than a model with higher BIC values does (see e.g., Kaplan
and Depaoli, 2012). For mediator analysis all variables included
in the mediation were required to correlate with each other
(Baron and Kenny, 1986).
RESULTS
The descriptive values of the sample’s performances in the GDT
and the executive tests are shown in Table 1.
The GDT scores and the neuropsychological test scores are all
in the normal range, comparable to other studies (Jensen and
Rohwer, 1966; Lineweaver et al., 1999; Tombaugh, 2004; Sheridan
et al., 2006; Verdejo-García and Pérez-García, 2007; Brand et al.,
2009a). The average GDT net score around six indicates that the
participants made on average about six more decisions for low
risk options than for high risk options. However, there was high
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Table 1 | Descriptive values of the sample’s performances in estimated intelligence, GDT, and the executive functioning tests.
Range M SD Skewness Kurtosis
Intelligencea 85–140 114.98 11.42 −0.23 0.94
GDT net scoreb −18–18 6.63 11.12 −0.83 −0.40
CWITc 46–123 70.26 13.91 0.78 1.02
TMT Bc,d 25–140 60.05 23.10 0.32 −0.32
MCST non-perseverative errors 0–27 8.60 6.06 0.89 0.12
MCST perseverative errorsd 0–18 2.28 3.38 1.05 0.59
BST 1d,e 0.01–0.43 0.14 0.11 −0.012 −0.77
BST 2d,e 0.01–0.43 0.13 0.11 −0.015 −0.72
Abbreviations: GDT, Game of Dice Task; CWIT, Color Word Interference Test; TMT B, Trail Making Test part B; MCST, Modified Card Sorting Test; BST, Balanced
Switching Task.
aEstimated with subtest reasoning of the Leistungsprüfsystem [German intelligence test battery].
bNet score (number of low risk decisions—number of high risk decisions).
cTime in seconds (higher scores represent worse performance).
dThe variable was logarithmically transformed. For means and standard deviations we report the original values. The skewness and kurtosis values are those for the
logarithmically transformed versions of the variables.
eDeviation score (percentage of deviation from optimally balanced performance on all four tasks).
variance indicating that there were many participants deciding
substantially more risky or substantially less risky. To get further
insight into the general behavior in the GDTwe analyzed the aver-
age frequency of choices for all four risk alternatives (one number,
two, three, and four numbers) and the development of behavior
over the task’s course (separated into six blocks with three deci-
sions each, as also done in Schiebener et al., 2013). See Figure 2
for the descriptive values.
As known from previous studies, there was a significant main
effect of risk alternative, F(2.47, 372.47) = 24.55, p < 0.001, partial
η² = 0.14, indicating that the participants made more choices
with lower risk. Furthermore, there was a significant main effect
of block, F(3.94, 594.94) = 12.29, p < 0.001, partial η² = 0.08. As
observed by Schiebener et al. (2013) the participants made on
average more risky decisions in the first two blocks and less
risky decisions thereafter. The main correlations can be found in
Table 2.
There were low to moderate significant correlations between
the measures of executive functions and the GDT net score.
Furthermore, there was an inverse correlation between age and
the GDT net score (r = −0.20, p = 0.015), which is comparable
to previous studies with the GDT (e.g., Brand and Markowitsch,
2010; Brand and Schiebener, 2013). Age was correlated with all
scores of executive functioning (rs from 0.37 to 0.46, ps < 0.001).
Within the CWIT the correlation between the time needed and
the number of errors was not significant, r = 0.13, p = 0.111.
(Note:We also calculated all correlations with Spearman’s rho and
Kendall’s tau. None of the correlation coefficients substantially
changed in comparison to the Pearson correlations. Furthermore,
we controlled for age effects by adding age as an additional pre-
dictor in all SEMs. Including age, the fit indices of the models fell
below the acceptability thresholds. Thus, age was not included in
the following main analyses).
Before calculating the seven main models for addressing the
two aims of the study, we verified the arrangement of the latent
dimensions by testing nine control models. Please note that we
FIGURE 2 | Descriptive values of GDT behavior. Top: Mean number of
choices for the four risk alternatives. Bottom: Course of behavior over the
task’s duration with regard to net score (number of low risk
choices—number of high risk choices) in six blocks á three decisions. Error
bars are standard errors.
did not aim at finding the one best possible model of all models
that could have been created with the set or subsets of the vari-
ables involved. Instead, we tested nine alternative arrangements
of the three latent dimensions to make sure that we do not
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Table 2 | Correlations between GDT net score and tests of executive functions.
1 GDT net 2 3 4 5 6
scorea
2 CWITb −0.18*
3 TMT Bb,c −0.33** 0.50**
4 MCST non−perseverative errors −0.25** 0.26** 0.37**
5 MCST perseverative errorsc −0.19* 0.32** 0.31** 0.76**
6 BST 1c,d −0.24** 0.32** 0.36** 0.30** 0.34**
7 BST 2c,d −0.19* 0.40** 0.39** 0.21** 0.27** 0.67**
The color codes illustrate the effect sizes (see legend below).
Abbreviations: GDT, Game of Dice Task; CWIT, Color Word Interference Test; TMT B, Trail Making Test part B; MCST, Modified Card Sorting Test; BST, Balanced
Switching Task.
*p = 0.05.
**p = 0.01.
Color code:
Small effect (r ≥ 0.1).
Moderate effect (r ≥ 0.3).
Large effect (r ≥ 0.5).
aNet score (number of low risk decisions—number of high risk decisions).
bTime in seconds (higher scores represent worse performance).
cThe variable was logarithmically transformed.
dDeviation score (percentage of deviation from optimally balanced performance on all four tasks).
find an arrangement of latent dimensions that fits significantly
better than the three dimension model. Using χ²-model compar-
ison, the nine were then compared to the “basic” three dimen-
sion model assuming no indirect effects (model 2). The nine
models were:
- a model summing all manifest variables in one latent
dimension.
- two models in which manifest variables were arbitrarily
interchanged between the latent dimensions.
- three models consolidating the manifest variables of two
dimensions.
- three models excluding one of the latent dimension.
In summary, the results were the following: Most of the mod-
els have insufficient model fit values and fit significantly worse
with the data than did model 2. Only the models excluding
one dimension fit comparably to model 2. Given that they
did not fit better than model 2 and given that we aimed at
comparing the impact of all three executive components on
decision making, we stick with the three dimensions defined
beforehand.
Table 3 shows the fit indices of the seven main models that
were tested to address the two aims of this study.
The models with only one mediator (model 1, 3, 4) as well
as the model without a mediator (model 2) have equal model
fits. This is no error. Instead, it indicates that none of these
models can be preferred over the others. Only the two models
assuming general control as mediator beside one of the other
latent domains (model 5 and 6) fit significantly worse than
the “basic model” (model 2) and the “hypothesized model”
(model 1), smallest χ²diff = 10.11, p < 0.001. Given that the
hypothesized model (model 1) does not fit better than some of
the other mediation models, there is no evidence for preferring
the hypothesized model over the others.
In all models there is an obvious systematic pattern with regard
to the role of the three executive domains. In all models general
control is the main predictor of GDT performance. Furthermore,
all significant indirect effects involve general control as the
mediator.
These results can be summarized as follows. GDT net score can
mainly be explained by general control. Concept formation and
monitoring do not contribute to the variance in GDT net score
unless they are mediated by general control.
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to investigate the extent of contribution of
three different executive functions to the variance in decision-
making performance under objective risk conditions, measured
with the GDT. Furthermore, it aimed to examine the interac-
tive influence of different executive functions on decision making
under objective risk. Based on the model of decision making
under risk (Brand et al., 2006) and the CS-SAS model of exec-
utive functioning (e.g., Norman and Shallice, 1986; Stuss et al.,
1995; Shallice, 2002; Shallice and Stuss, 2008), we tested seven
main SEM-models projecting different mediation assumptions
with regard to the executive functions’ effects on decision mak-
ing under objective risk. Using different executive functioning
tests, we tried to assess three executive functions: general con-
trol (supposed to load on general attentional and behavioral
self-control), monitoring (supposed to load on supervision of
behavior in accordance with task states and goals that are conse-
quently kept in mind), and concept formation (supposed to load
on categorization, rule detection, and set maintenance). At this
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Table 3 | The fit indices of the seven main SEMs.
Model df χ² P BIC RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR R²(GDT
net
score)
Significant
predictors of
GDT net score
Significant
indirect
effects
Model 1 Hypothesized
model (Mediator: General
control)
9 13.02 0.162 4342.40 0.05 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.15* General control
(β = −0.34*)
Monitoring →
general control
→ GDT net
score
(β = −0.17,
p = 0.056)
Model 2 “Basic model”
(Independent predictors)
9 13.02 0.162 4342.40 0.05 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.15* General control
(β = −0.34*)
Not applicable
Model 3 (Mediator:
Concept formation)
9 13.02 0.162 4342.40 0.05 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.15* General control
(β = −0.34*)
n.s.
Model 4 (Mediator:
Monitoring)
9 13.02 0.162 4342.40 0.05 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.15* General control
(β = −0.34*)
n.s.
Model 5 (Mediators:
General control and
monitoring)
10 32.76 < 0.001 4357.11 0.12 0.93 0.86 0.086 0.14* General control
(β = −0.31*)
Concept
formation →
general control
→ GDT net
score
(β = −0.16*)
Model 6 (Mediators:
General control and
concept formation)
10 23.13 0.010 4347.48 0.09 0.96 0.91 0.06 0.14* General control
(β = −0.33*)
Monitoring →
General control
→ GDT net
score
(β = −0.22*)
Model 7 (Mediators:
Monitoring and concept
formation)
10 13.33 0.206 4337.68 0.047 0.99 0.98 0.028 0.15* General control
(β = −0.35*)
n.s.
*p = 0.05.
Abbreviations: df, Degrees of freedom; BIC, Bayes Information Criterion; RMSEA, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI, Comparative Fit Index; TLI, Tucker
Lewis Index; SRMR, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; GDT, Game of Dice Task.
Small standardized beta value (β ≥ 0.1).
Moderate standardized beta value (β ≥ 0.3).
point, we want to sensitize the reader once more to the fact that
the assumption that the used executive tasks assess these three
functions is based on nomore than an evaluation of the tasks’ face
validities.
Generally, the amount of explained variance of decision-
making performance (i.e., maximally 15%) supports the assump-
tion that the ability to exert executive control over behavior
and cognition is a predictor of decision-making performance.
However, a large proportion of variance remains unexplained,
indicating that there are further variables affecting decision-
making performance.
The sub-domains of executive functions were all correlated
with GDT performance on the bivariate level. Nevertheless, in the
seven models performances in the tests used to measure mon-
itoring and concept formation did no longer directly predict
decision-making performance. Instead, the main direct predictor
of decision making were individual differences in performances
in the tests used to measure general control. Performances in
tests used to assess monitoring and concept formation affected
decision making only indirectly in model 1, 5, and 6, in which
general control was defined as mediator. Thus, when assuming
that the tests used are valid measures of the three executive
domains, the results suggest that among different executive
functions, general control has a key role for decision-making
under risk. Concept formation and monitoring may also be
involved but the two functions seem to be “unable” to affect
decision-making performance without the involvement of general
control.
These indirect effects indicate that components of executive
functioning influence decision making in a mutually depen-
dent relationship. A possible interpretation is that supervisory
executive control processes are implemented via general control
functions.
This interpretation is in line with the CS-SAS model (Norman
and Shallice, 1986; Stuss et al., 1995). It generally states that
executive functioning is required for developing a schema (e.g.,
a strategy) for the non-routine situations (e.g., new decision
situations). In detail, supervisory functions, such as our mon-
itoring and concept formation functions, are suggested to be
responsible for development and application of schemas. Thereby
they direct and schedule when a schema is implemented (e.g.,
a planned series of five decisions for four-number alternatives),
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other schemas have to be inhibited (e.g., the impulse to make
decisions for alternatives offering higher potential gains), or new
schemas are developed (e.g., a less risky strategy, when higher
risks have previously led to negative consequences). Such con-
trol over schemas was suggested to be implemented by the general
functions responsible for exerting executive control over cognitive
processing resources (e.g., for inhibiting inappropriate schemas;
Stuss et al., 1995).
The results fit well with the findings of an fMRI study by
Labudda et al. (2008) in which participants had to make deci-
sions between die bets similar to those in the GDT. During these
decisions, activations of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex have
been interpreted as a correlate of the categorization of alterna-
tives. Categorization processes were in our study operationalized
with the MCST, which showed a marginally significant indirect
effect on decision making in the GDT. The MCST is a modified
version of theWisconsin Card Sorting Test, during which the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex has been found to be active (Lie et al.,
2006). Furthermore, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was active
during one of the general control tasks, the CWIT (Kaufmann
et al., 2005). Labudda and colleagues also reported that the ante-
rior cingulate cortex was activated during decision making under
risk. The anterior cingulate cortex has been associated with the
allocation and maintenance of cognitive control (Holroyd and
Yeung, 2012; Shenhav et al., 2013), and with conflict detection
and resolution (Suchan et al., 2005). These functions are close to
what we suggest to be measured by the general control tasks in the
current study.
Future studies may further decompose the neurocognitive cor-
relates of decision making under risk. Particularly, one may think
of several other ways of investigating the role of different exec-
utive functions for decision making under objective risk. It may
especially be considered a theoretical progress if studies succeed
in delineating the differential roles of very basic executive func-
tions for decision making (e.g., the roles of inhibition, updating,
shifting, coding, etc.).
Beyond enhancing our understanding of the contribution of
different executive functions to decisionmaking, the observations
in the current study can be interpreted with respect to the inter-
play of different executive functions during performance onmore
complex tasks. Many important studies have identified separate
roles of different executive functions for domains of human per-
formance, such as intelligence (Friedman et al., 2006), decision
making (Del Missier et al., 2010; Gansler et al., 2011), or complex
executive tasks (Miyake et al., 2000). The results of the current
study extent the findings of these previous studies by pointing out
that the effect of specific executive functions on a more complex
task can be mediated by other executive functions.
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APPENDIX
Information on outlier detection methods (regression with a ran-
dom variable, analysis of studentized t, SPSS case-wise methods,
and visual control): In the regressions with the random vari-
able, only the correlation with BST 2 was significant, r = 0.16,
p = 0.049, but regarding the scatterplot between the random
variable and BST 2 no outliers could be identified. All other cor-
relations with the random variable were not significant, rs <
0.12, ps > 0.144. There were studentized ts beyond |3.00|, but in
none of the cases their removal changed the correlation between
the two variables remarkably. Thus, following the procedure also
used by Miyake et al. (2000), these cases were not removed. SPSS
case-wise methods revealed no cases extremely influencing the
regressions between any pair of variables. An additional visual
control revealed no outliers either. However, single cases at the
edges of the distribution were tentatively removed. In none of
the cases the correlation between the two variables was changed
remarkably. The scatterplots including the dependent variable,
GDT net score, can be found in Figure A1. All other scatterplots
can be requested from the first author.
FIGURE A1 | The scatterplots between GDT net score and the scores of the executive functioning tests.
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